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economic efficiency. An employer or union that successfully defends its
labor practices against unreasonable attack confers a substantial benefit on
commerce and vindicates the strong Congressional policy of efficient em-
ployment of labor.
Denying prevailing Title VII defendants the benefit of section 706(k),
except when subjected to suits brought in bad faith, is inappropriate. The
"reasonableness" standard, which would exclude all suits brought in bad
faith or upon unreasonable or meritless (though perhaps colorable) grounds,
more properly implements the policies of Title VII, and reflects more
accurately the equities of Title VII litigation.8 9
SAUL LouIs MOSKOWITZ
Criminal Law-Controlled Substances-North Carolina
Adopts a Novel View of Physician Punishment
Under Controlled Substances Act
One of the major concerns of state and federal legislation in the past
decade has been the illicit diversion of controlled substances from legitimate
channels of distribution. ' While courts interpreting this legislation generally
89. The reasonableness of a Title VII suit should, of course, be resolved by the trial court
by reference to the policies underlying Title VII and the equities of each case. Some factual
considerations are of particular relevance. The court should determine to what extent the
EEOC procedures were used to obtain settlement of the claim. A prior EEOC finding of no
reasonable cause, though not dispositive of the reasonableness issue, should be accorded heavy
weight, if based upon extensive investigation. Similarly, a conciliation agreement that was
refused by the plaintiff-complainant, if fair and reached by the EEOC and defendant in good
faith, should operate to thrust upon the plaintiff a greater risk of an adverse § 706(k) award. The
court can thereby promote the full and effective involvement of the EEOC in Title VII disputes.
Substantial abuse of the EEOC or court processes, including "bad faith" suits, seems to be
patently unreasonable. Abuse of less egregious sorts can be balanced along with other con-
siderations. Other considerations should be given weight. For example, did defendant prevail
on the merits or on procedural grounds? An award of attorneys' fees for prevailing on
procedural grounds does not further the policy of efficient allocation of labor for no labor
practices have been approved.
In weighing relevant factors, the benefits foreseeably flowing from a successful complaint
should be weighed according to the probability that success would have been realized. In the
instant case, the probability of success by the EEOC was low, because the argument that its
power to sue eo nomine was retroactive to 1965 was untenable in view of the wording of § 14.
See note 5 supra. If interpretation of that section had not been an issue of first impression, but
had been previously construed in a manner hostile to the EEOC position, the probability of
success would have been even lower. The probability of success turns, then, on what strength
the case of both parties could reasonably have been said to have at the outset of the litigation.
1. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1444, Pt. 1, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in
[19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4566, 4566 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].
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have concluded that physicians who dispense drugs for invalid purposes are
subject to the same penalties as ordinary street traffickers, the North Caroli-
na Supreme Court recently gave a different interpretation to North
Carolina's statutory scheme. In State v. Best,2 a case in which a physician
was accused of the illegal sale and delivery of controlled substances, 3 the
court ruled that a dual system of punishment, based on the status of the
offender, exists in North Carolina.
Dr. Best's arrest4 resulted fromja statewide crackdown on physicians
conducted by a small investigative squad specifically constituted to probe
the diversion of prescription drugs. 5 He had prescribed Ritalin, a Schedule II
controlled substance,6 on three separate occasions to an agent who claimed
that she worked nights and "needed something to stay awake.'" The doctor
2. 292 N.C. 294, 233 S.E.2d 544 (1977). The indictments charged that "on or about the
19th day of March, 1975, in Pitt County Andrew Arthur Best unlawfully and wilfully did
feloniously sell and deliver a controlled substance . . . not within the normal course of his
professional practice .... Record at 13-14, State v. Best, 31 N.C. App. 250,229 S.E.2d 581
(1976). In addition to the charges discussed here, defendant was accused of selling a Schedule II
substance to two other State Bureau of Investigation agents on March 18, 1975 and March 6,
1975. Defendant was acquitted on these latter charges. 292 N.C. at 301, 233 S.E.2d at 549.
3. A "controlled substance" is a drug or other substance described in Schedules I
through VI of the Controlled Substances Act. It does not include distilled spirits, wine or
tobacco. 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-87(5) (1975); see notes 6, 8 & 82 infra.
The North Carolina Controlled Substances Act was amended seven times during the most
recent legislative session. For a comprehensive list of those amendments, see note 35 infra.
Amendments are cited elsewhere only when pertinent to the statutory language under discus-
sion.
4. Police stated that the charges against Dr. Best resulted from a four month undercover
operation by local officers and State Bureau of Investigation agents. Raleigh, N.C., News and
Observer, Mar. 27, 1975, § A, at I, col. 6.
5. North Carolina is one of the first states to concentrate enforcement efforts against
medical professionals who engage in the indiscriminate dispensing or issuing of prescriptions
for controlled substances. For a discussion of this program, see Davis, Drug Abuse Control:
Prescribing Controlled Substance Drugs, 6 CUM. L. REV. 331 (1975); Weir, Legitimate Drugs: A
Coordinated Effort to Prevent their Diversion into the Black Market, 4 CONTEMP. DRUG PROn.
483, 485 (1975).
6. A Schedule II controlled substance is one characterized by "a high potential for
abuse; currently accepted medical use in the United States, or currently accepted medical use
with severe restrictions; and the abuse of the substance may lead to severe psychic or physical
dependence." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-90 (1975 & Supp. 1975). Examples are methadone,
morphine, cocaine and amphetamines. Unless dispensed directly by a practitioner other than a
pharmacist to an ultimate user, these substances may be dispensed only on written prescription
except in certain emergency situations in which case an oral prescription must be reduced
promptly to writing. 21 U.S.C. § 829(a) (1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-106(a), (b) (1975), as
amended by Law of June 22, 1977, ch. 677, § 3(8), 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 267 (Pamphlet
No. 10, Pt. 1).
7. 292 N.C. at 295, 233 S.E.2d at 546. On her first visit to Dr. Best's office, the agent
gave a medical history and the receptionist weighed her and took her temperature and blood
pressure. Dr. Best, after conversing with the.oagent, issued the prescription for 36 pills. The
agent saw Dr. Best briefly on her second visit; she testified that she did not see him on her third
visit. Dr. Best testified that he did talk with her on her third visit and that he told her "she could
not stay on this medication forever." Id. at 299, 233 S.E.2d at 548. Each refill also was for 36
pills.
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also dispensed Phenobarbital, a Schedule IV controlled substance,' to her
when she complained of nervousness. The State maintained that such
activities were outside the usual course of a doctor's professional practice in
this state and were not for a legitimate medical purpose. 9 Dr. Best insisted
that he had used proper diagnostic procedures and was prescribing small,
carefully monitored quantities of Ritalin to treat intermittent narcolepsy. 10
Dr. Best also claimed that he dispensed the Phenobarbital to combat side
effects from the Ritalin after the agent told him that she had stopped taking
the stimulant drug. 1
Dr. Best was convicted of two counts of sale and delivery of Ritalin. 12
The court of appeals upheld the convictions.13 The North Carolina Supreme
Court reversed on the ground that Dr. Best had been charged under North
Carolina General Statutes section 90-95(a)(1)' 4 for the felonious "sale and
delivery" of a controlled substance while he should have been indicted
under section 90-108 for "distributing or dispensing" the drug. I5 The court
8. A Schedule IV controlled substance is one with "a low potential for abuse relative to
the substances listed in Schedule III of this Article; currently accepted medical use in the
United States; and limited physical or psychological dependence relative to the substances
listed in Schedule III of this Article." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-92 (Supp. 1975). An example is
tranquilizers. Except when dispensed directly by a practitioner to an ultimate user, Schedule IV
drugs must be dispensed by a prescription and oral prescriptions shall be reduced promptly to
writing. Limits are placed on the time and number of refills allowed. 21 U.S.C. § 829(b) (1970);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-106(c) (1975).
The agent's blood pressure and temperature were taken and she talked with the doctor
before the 115 Phenobarbital tablets were dispensed directly to her by him. 292 N.C. at 297, 233
S.E.2d at 546.
9. See 292 N.C. at 302, 233 S.E.2d at 549.
10. Id. at 299, 253 S.E.2d at 548. Narcolepsy is a sleeping disorder and is one of the
conditions for which Ritalin has a legitimate use. Id. at 298,233 S.E.2d at 547. Dr. Best testified
that he issued the two refills because his receptionist said that the agent had not reported any
side effects from the medication. Id. at 299, 233 S.E.2d at 548.
I1. Id. at 299, 233 S.E.2d at 548.
12. The convictions were for the two refill prescriptions. Id. at 301, 233 S.E.2d at 549.
13. 31 N.C. App. 250, 229 S.E.2d 581 (1976). The court of appeals dismissed Dr. Best's
argument that the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-86 to
-113.8 (1975 & Supp. 1975), was so imprecise as to be unconstitutionally vague. He had argued
that the standard applied to him under id. § 90-87(22)(a) (1975), "within the normal course of
professional practice," did not give adequate guidance to enable a physician to know when his
activities were outside the standard and therefore illegal prescriptions under the Act. The court
found the phrase not unacceptably vague because it gives the practitioner fair notice of the
standard he must follow to legally prescribe controlled substances under the statute. Id. at 264,
229 S.E.2d at 589. This conclusion follows that of the federal courts interpreting the similar
federal statute, e.g., United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1031 (1975); United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1973).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(a)(1) (1975), enacted in 1973, amended Law of July 19, 1971,
ch. 919, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 1977. This section states that "[e]xcept as authorized by this
Article, it is unlawful for any person . . . [t]o manufacture, sell or deliver, or possess with
intent to manufacture, sell or deliver, a controlled substance."
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-108(a)(2) (1975) states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person
who is . . .a practitioner to distribute or dispense a controlled substance in violation of G.S.
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explained that because a physician is authorized to write prescriptions for
controlled substances, he is not subject to the constraints of section 90-
95(a)(1). 16 If he writes a prescription "outside the normal course of profes-
sional practice in North Carolina and not for a legitimate medical purpose,"
however, the physician violates section 90-108.17 The court concluded that
"while the indictments follow the language of G.S. 90-95(a)(1), the evi-
dence discloses a violation, if at all, of G.S. 90-108 ' 18 and that because of
this "fatal variance," the court of appeals erred in not dismissing the
action. 19
The North Carolina Controlled Substances Act is patterned after federal
legislation that originated with the Harrison Act in 1914.20 The federal
statute, initially designed as a tax measure,21 had a primary purpose of
bringing "the domestic traffic in narcotics into the open under a licensing
system, so that sloppy dispensing practices of the day could be checked.' '22
The Harrison Act provided an explicit statutory exemption for the physician
who prescribed or dispensed narcotics "to a patient. . . in the course of his
professional practice only. ',23 As abuses in the drug area increased, Con-
gress passed numerous laws dealing with various aspects of the problem.24
Finally, in 1970, in an effort to coordinate the plethora of drug legislation
90-105 or 90-106." Id. § 90-105 states that "[controlled substances included in Schedules I and
II of this Article shall be distributed only by a registrant or practitioner, pursuant to an order
form." Id. § 90-106 (1975 & Supp. 1975), as amended by Law of June 22, 1977, ch. 667, § 3(8),
1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 267 (Pamphlet No. 10, Pt. 1), sets forth the prescription and
labeling requirements for the various schedules of controlled substances. See, e.g., notes 6 & 8
supra.
16. 292 N.C. at 310, 233 S.E.2d at 554.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 311, 233 S.E.2d at 554.
20. The Narcotic Drug Act of Dec. 17, 1914, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785. This was the first
significant legislative attempt to control drugs and drug traffic.
21. Recent Developments, District of Columbia Circuit Holds Severe Penalty Provision of
Controlled Substances Act Not Applicable to Registered Physician, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 179,
181 (1975).
22. King, The Narcotics Bureau and the Harrison Act: Jailing the Healers and the Sick, 62
YALE L.J. 736, 737 (1953).
23. The Narcotic Drug Act of Dec. 17, 1914, ch. 1, § 2(a), 38 Stat. 786. This phrase
has since been interpreted to mean that the physician who dispenses the narcotic drugs
mentioned in the Act is protected from prosecution under the Act only when he does not depart
from the usual course of medical practice. See Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189,
194 (1920). Note 13 supra discusses North Carolina's comparable phraseology. In United States
v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975), the Supreme Court cited Jin Fuey Moy and its progeny as proof
that the Harrison Act, predecessor of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-996
(West 1972 & Cum. Supp. 1977), contemplated conviction of physicians who acted outside the
usual course of medical practice under the same terms as applied to nonmedical traffickers. 423
U.S. at 132. The Moore Court added that there was no indication that Congress, in passing the
1970 Act, intended to change this treatment of doctors. Id. at 131-33, 139.
24. See HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 6, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.,
NEWS at 4571.
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and to devise a more flexible penalty structure that would strengthen law
enforcement, Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act (the Act).25 In
prosecutions under the Act, the overwhelming majority of federal courts that
have considered the matter have upheld convictions 26 of physicians for
violations under the general provision of the Act, which makes it unlawful
for "any person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense . . . a controlled substance.''27 Technical violations, such as
improper use of drug order forms or failure to employ a written prescription
when required, were punished under separate portions of the Act. 28 The
courts based their interpretation on the overall legislative purpose of the
Controlled Substances Act to strengthen enforcement and on the notion that
doctors who are also traffickers should be subject to the same penalties as
other drug offenders.29
25. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-996 (West 1972 & Cum. Supp. 1977); see HousE REPORT, supra note
-I, at 1, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4566. Harrison Act prosecutions
were based on the nature of the drug involved and a single penalty applied to all narcotic drugs.
In revising the penalty structure, Congress classified controlled substances into five categories
based on their potential for abuse, value for treatment and resulting psychological and physical
effects. Provisions were made for adding or removing drugs from the five schedules as new
medical evidence suggests. Thus, the legislative history of the Act shows that Congress has
continued to be concerned with the nature of the drug in the transaction rather than with the
status of the defendant. United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 133-34 (1975).
26. E.g., United States v. Badia, 490 F.2d 296 (1st Cir. 1973) (per curiam); United States
v. Bartee, 479 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1973);
cf. United States v. Leigh, 487 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1973) (allowing insufficient indictment to be
redrawn). Contra, United States v. Moore, 505 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 122
(1975).
27. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970) (emphasis added). The section more fully states that
"[e]xcept as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance." Compare North Carolina's version quoted in
note 14 supra.
Some of the factors that courts have considered relevant to convictions of physicians
under § 841 include lack of a physical examination before prescribing a controlled substance,
knowledge by the doctor that his patients are prone to trade or otherwise dispose of the drugs,
use of slang terms for the drugs by patients and/or doctor, telling patients to get their prescrip-
tions filled at different stores to prevent suspicion by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, billing patients based on the quantity of drugs prescribed rather than on the medical
services performed, lack of supervision of administration of the drug, no precautions against
misuse or diversion, no known health complaints by patients and actual increases in drug usage
by patients while under the doctor's care. See United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975);
United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975); United
States v. Bartee, 479 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1973). State courts, construing their own versions of
the Federal Controlled Substances Act, have applied the equivalent of § 841 to doctors. E.g.,
State v. Vinson, 298 So. 2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Anderson v. State, 231 Ga. 243,201
S.E.2d 147 (1973).
28. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 842(a)(1) (1970) provides "[lit shall be unlawful for any person who
is subject to the requirements of part C to distribute or dispense a controlled substance in
violation of section 829 of this title." Persons, including doctors, who are required to register in
order to dispense controlled substances are subject to the requirements of part C. 21 U.S.C. §
829 (1970) outlines the proper procedure for issuing prescriptions. See notes 6 & 8 supra.
29. See United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 132(1975); HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at
1-4, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4566-71.
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In United States v. Moore ,30 the United States Supreme Court unani-
mously endorsed the view that physicians could be prosecuted under the
main felony provision of the Act.31 Stating that the legislative history of the
Act showed a Congressional concern with the nature of the drug transaction
rather than with the status of the defendant, the Court held that the relevant
inquiry was whether the activity itself fell within legitimate channels.32 The
Court noted that Congress expressed a particular concern because physicians
have the greatest access to controlled substances and had been responsible
for a large part of the illegal drug traffic. 33 It concluded,
We think it immaterial whether Dr. Moore also could have
been prosecuted for his violation of the statutory provisions relat-
ing to dispensing procedures. There is nothing in the statutory
scheme or legislative history that justifies a conclusion that a
registrant who may be prosecuted for the relatively minor offense
of violating § 829 [prescription requirements] is thereby exempted
from prosecution under § 841 for the sigiificantly greater offense
of acting as a drug "pusher.
'34
The same concerns that led Congress to pass comprehensive federal
drug legislation prompted many states, including North Carolina,35 to pass
their own versions of the Act. The model for state legislation was the
30. 423 U.S. 122 (1975), rev'g 505 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
31. Before its reversal, the District of Columbia Circuit was the sole court of appeals
applying a lesser standard of punishment for a physician under the federal act. Dr. Moore was
charged in multiple counts with the unlawful distribution and dispensing of methadone, a
Schedule II substance, without obtaining the special authorization required for conducting a
maintenance program. 423 U.S. at 124. Among the most damaging testimony was that the
doctor's fees were based on the quantity of the drug prescribed rather than medical services
rendered and the fact that several patients dramatically increased their usage of drugs while
under his care. The doctor also felt the necessity of having armed guards at the entrance to his
office and kept a revolver on his desk.
The court of appeals based its decision on the overall statutory framework of the law to
"strongly suggest" that "Congress intended to deal with registrants primarily through a system
of administrative controls, relying on modest penalty provisions to enforce those controls, and
reserving the severe penalties provided for in § 841 for those seeking to avoid regulation entirely
by not registering." 505 F.2d at 430. For a discussion of this case, see Recent Developments,
supra note 21.
32. 423 U.S. at 135.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 138; accord, United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (defendant
does not have constitutional right to demand prosecution exclusively under the statute prescrib-
ing lesser penalties); see, e.g., notes 6 & 8 supra.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-86 to -113.8 (1975 & Supp. 1975), as amended by Law of June
7, 1977, ch. 482, § 6, 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 112 (Pamphlet No. 9), Law of June 21, 1977,
ch. 642, § 2, 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 197-200 (Pamphlet No. 10, Pt. I), Law of June 22,
1977, ch. 667, § 3, 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 265-68 (Pamphlet No. 10, Pt. 1), Law of July 1,
1977, ch. 862, 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 404-05 (Pamphlet No. I1, Pt. I), Law of July 1, 1977,
ch. 891, 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 515-18 (Pamphlet No. 11, Pt. 2) & Law of July 1, 1977, ch.
907, 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 564-65 (Pamphlet No. I1, Pt. 2).
19781
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Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 36 a set of provisions with the stated
purpose of supplying "an interlocking trellis of Federal and State law to
enable government at all levels to control more effectively the drug abuse
problem." ' 37 North Carolina's Controlled Substances Act, passed in 1971,
retains the primary attributes of the federal and uniform statutes.
38
With the exception of the Best opinion, all federal and state courts that
have considered the position of physicians in statutory schemes covering
drug offenses have found United States v. Moore dispositive of the mat-
ter. 39 In justifying its contrary position, the North Carolina Supreme Court
asserted that "several aspects of the North Carolina Controlled Substances
Act differ from both the Uniform Controlled Substances Act and the Federal
Controlled Substances Act and lend credence to the view which we have
taken. "4 Thus, an examination of the differences among the acts and their
36. UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES AcT, reprinted at 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED
146 (1973).
37. Id., Prefatory Note.
38. North Carolina added §§ 90-94, -95.1 to .3, -96.1, -98, -107, -108, -109.1, -112.1,
-113.4 to .6 t6 the Uniform Act. See 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 175-79 (1973).
In its brief in Best the State said that "the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act
basically tracts [sic] the United States Controlled Substances Act, the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 .... " New Brief for State at 17.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Fellman, 549 F.2d 181 (10th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); United
States v. Hooker, 541 F.2d 300 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815 (9th Cir.
1976); United States v. Hicks, 529 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 856 (1976); United
States v. ElIzey, 527 F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); King v. State, 336 So. 2d 1200 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976); State v. Fearing, 30 Md. App. 134,351 A.2d 896 (1976); Commonwealth v.
Comins, - Mass. -, 356 N.E.2d 241 (1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1582 (1977); People v.
Alford, 73 Mich. App. 604, 251 N.W.2d 318 (1977); State v. Vaccaro, 142 N.J. Super. 167, 361
A.2d 47 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 71 N.J. 518, 366 A.2d 674 (1976). Two cases were
decided while Moore was on appeal and both of them applied § 841 to physicians. See United
States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975); United States v.
Green, 511 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1976).
40. 292 N.C. at 308, 233 S.E.2d at 553. In explaining its interpretation of the North
Carolina Act, the court said:
In skeletal form the present system of control over physicians operates as fol-
lows: (1) All transactions with controlled substances are prohibited by G.S. 90-95
except as authorized. (2) Under G.S. 90-101 a physician who meets established
objective critieria is authorized to make certain transactions with controlled sub-
stances and thus is exempted from the proscriptions of G.S. 90-95.
Id. at 303, 233 S.E.2d at 550. The "objective criteria" required by the court are that the person
meet the registration requirements of the Act and be engaged only in transactions using drugs
authorized by his registration. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-101(a), (b) (1975), as amended by Law
of June 22, 1977, ch. 667, § 3(6), 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 266 (Pamphlet No. 10, Pt. 1) &
Law of July 1, 1977, ch. 891, § 4(1), 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 517 (Pamphlet No. 11, Pt. 2).
Physicians are permitted to prescribe and dispense all drugs except those in Schedule I, defined
in note 82 infra. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-106 (1975 & Supp. 1975), as amended by Law of June 22,
1977, ch. 667, § 3(8), 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 267 (Pamphlet No. 10, Pt. 1); cf. United
States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d'190, 202 (9th Cir.) (dissent), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975)
(interpreting comparable federal statute). The court added that "[c]ontrol is reasserted under
G.S. 90-108 whereby the physician's actions with respect to these transactions must be within
the normal course of professional practice in this State and for a legitimate medical purpose."
292 N.C. at 303, 233 S.E.2d at 550. See generally note 15 supra.
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significance to North Carolina's regulatory scheme is essential to an under-
standing of the court's holding in State v. Best.
In Best, the North Carolina Supreme Court placed great emphasis on a
1973 amendment to section 90-95 that changed the wording of the pro-
hibited activity from "manufacture, distribute or dispense" to "manufac-
ture, sell or deliver.''41 From this action the court concluded:
By the use of "sell or deliver"-words of the street-rather than
"distribute or dispense"-which have technical medical connota-
tions and which are used extensively in those sections relating to
regulation of registrants and practitioners-the Legislature intend-
ed to clarify and emphasize the dual nature of the regulatory
scheme.
42
The new statutory language on which the North Carolina Supreme
Court relies has also been subject to interpretation by other courts. In
discussing whether a physician can properly be charged with the "sale" of a
controlled substance, the United States Supreme Court has maintained that
there is "no necessary repugnance between prescribing and selling." 4 3 In
reaching that conclusion, the Court relied heavily on the concept of the
physician as a principal who aids the patient in procuring an item that would
not otherwise be available to him.44 The North Carolina Criminal Code
contains a section comparable to the federal statute regarding aiding and
abetting.45 This section, it would seem, provides an analogous statutory
41. See 292 N.C. at 303-04, 233 S.E.2d at 550.
42. Id. at 309-10, 233 S.E.2d at 554.
43. Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 192 (1920). Defendant argued that the
act of selling or giving away a drug and the act of issuing a prescription are so essentially
different that to allege he sold the drug by prescribing it amounts to a contradiction of terms and
this repugnance renders the indictment fatally defective. The Court, dismissing the argument,
explained that "one may take a principal part in a prohibited sale of an opium derivative. . . by
unlawfully issuing a prescription to the would-be purchaser." Id.
Recent cases relying on Jin Fuey Moy include United States v. Bartee, 479 F.2d 484 (10th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1973); State v. Vinson, 298 So. 2d 505
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); accord, United States v. Bloom, 164 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 857 (1948); United States v. Brandenburg, 162 F.2d980 (3d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 769 (1947); United States v. Brandenburg, 155 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1946); Nigro v.
United States, 117 F.2d 624 (8th Cir. 1941) (all decided under Harrison Act). The United States
Supreme Court recently affirmed the vitality of these cases as precedent in United States v.
Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975).
44. Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 192 (1920).
45. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1970) with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-5 (1971), which states that
"[i]f any person shall counsel, procure or command any other person to commit any felony
. . . the person so counseling, procuring or commanding shall be guilty of a felony. ... One
of the many cases interpreting this statute provides that "[a]ll who are present," either actively
or constructively, "at the place of a crime and are either aiding, abetting, assisting, or advising
in its commission, or are present for such purpose," are principals in the crime. State v.
Dawson, 281 N.C. 645, 655, 190 S.E.2d 196, 202 (1972); accord, State v. Ball, 270 N.C. 25, 153
S.E.2d 741 (1967); State v. Spears, 268 N.C. 303, 150 S.E.2d 499 (1966); State v. Jarrell, 141
N.C. 722, 53 S.E. 127 (1906); State '. Gaston, 73 N.C. 93 (1875); State v. Torain, 20 N.C. App.
69, 200 S.E.2d 665 (1973), cert. denied, 284 N.C. 622 (1974).
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framework within which to interpret the Act. The North Carolina Supreme
Court, however, in arriving at a different conclusion from the United States
Supreme Court, provided no explanation for the variation in interpretations.
Similar problems in statutory interpretation arise in concluding that a
physician cannot be properly indicted for the "delivery" of a controlled
substance. In drafting the Uniform Act's primary felony section, the Com-
missioners deliberately chose the term "deliver" because it encompasses
both distributing and dispensing activities!46 Thus, it is reasonable to con-
clude that the North Carolina General Assembly did not merely substitute a
street term for a medical one, but that it chose the most comprehensive word
to describe a physician's activity in providing controlled substances to
others. 47 Generally, the correct method of statutory interpretation is that
enunciated by the North Carolina Supreme Court: "In the construction of
any statute. . . words must be given their common and ordinary meaning,
nothing else appearing. . . .[When] the statute itself, contains a definition
of a word used therein, that definition controls, however contrary to the
ordinary meaning of the word it may be. "48 Therefore, the "street" conno-
tation of "deliver" must be discarded in favor of the Act's definition, which
is "the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to
another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relation-
ship." 49 "Constructive delivery" has been held to include the issuing of a
46. UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT § 401, Commissioner's Note. Since the
passage of the Federal Act in 1970, a battle has raged in the courts over whether a physician
"distributes" or "dispenses" a drug. Courts holding that the proper term is "dispense" include
United States v. Green, 511 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975); United
States v. Leigh, 487 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bartee, 479 F.2d 484 (10th Cir.
i973). See also United States v. Hicks, 529 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 856
(1976). Those maintaining that "distribute" is the correct term are United States v. ElIzey, 527
F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975); United States v. Badia, 490 F.2d 296 (1st Cir. 1973) (per curiam);
United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1973). Helpful discussions of this distinction
may be found in United States v. Fellman, 549 F.2d 181, 182 (10th Cir. 1977) (per curiam);
Commonwealth v. Comins, - Mass. -, 356 N.E.2d 241 (1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1582
(1977); People v. Alford, 73 Mich. App. 604, 251 N.W.2d 314 (1977).
Moore did not resolve the dispute. In that case the indictment charged both distribution
and dispensing. 423 U.S. at 124; see note 31 supra. One court has condemned this argument as
being based on a "hyper-technical distinction" between the two terms even though there is no
"functional difference" in the context of the physician cases. United States v. Fellman, 549
F.2d at 182. Cf. Commonwealth v. Comins, - Mass. -, 356 N.E.2d241 (1976), cert. denied, 97
S. Ct. 1582 (1977) (choice of words should not be permitted to become crucial).
47. One factor supporting this view is the Uniform Act provision that it is to be "so
applied and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect
to the subject of this Act among those states which enact it." UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUB-
STANCES ACT § 603. See generally Barton, Controlled Substances Act of 1971, 52 MICH. ST. B.J.
617, 621, 623 (1973).
48. In re Clayton-Marcus Co., 286 N.C. 215, 219, 210 S.E.2d 199, 202-03 (1974); accord,
Johnston v. Gill, 224 N.C. 638, 32 S.E.2d 30 (1944); In re Steelman, 219 N.C. 306, 13 S.E.2d 544
(1941); Morris v. Laughlin Chevrolet Co., 217 N.C. 428, 8 S.E.2d 484 (1940).
49. 21 U.S.C. § 802(8) (1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-87(7) (1975); UNIFORM CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES ACT § 101(f).
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prescription. 50 Moreover, the terms "dispense" and "distribute," as identi-
cally defined in the North Carolina, Federal and Uniform Acts, are de-
scribed in terms of the "delivery" of a controlled substance.5 Thus, it is
extremely doubtful that a legislative intent to restrict the application of
section 90-95 solely to street traffickers can be inferred from the change of
language.52
The Best court also distinguished the North Carolina Act from its
federal and uniform counterparts on the basis of section 90-101(c)(4), which
exempted "practitioners licensed in North Carolina" from having to register
with the North Carolina Drug Authority in order to possess, distribute or
dispense a controlled substance. 53 The court discerned from this provision a
50. State v. Vinson, 298 So. 2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). The Vinson Court
interpreted the Florida law, which is phrased in the same terms as the North Carolina one: "[I]t
is unlawful for any person to sell, manufacture, or deliver. . . a controlled substance." FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 893.13(l)(a) (West 1976). The court specifically addressed the question whether
delivery of a drug could include the issuance of a prescription and relied on the definition of
"delivery" identically contained in the federal, uniform, Florida and North Carolina statutes.
The court concluded that the issuance of a prescription by a physician was a form of "construc-
tive" delivery and it was no defense that the actual transfer of the drug would be made by a
pharmacist pursuant to the order of the prescription. 298 So. 2d at 507; accord, King v. State,
336 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); People v. Alford, 73 Mich. App. 604,251 N.W.2d 314
(1977). See generally State v. Howell, 196 Neb. 832, 246 N.W.2d 479 (1976); State v. Guyott,
195 Neb. 593, 239 N.W.2d 781 (1976).
51. " 'Dispense' means to deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate user or research
subject by or pursuant to the lawful order of a practitioner, including the prescribing, adminis-
tering, packaging, labeling, or compounding necessary to prepare the substance for that deliv-
ery." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-87(8) (1975); UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT § 101(g). 21
U'S.C. § 802(10) (1970) is identical in the pertinent parts.
"'Distribute' means to deliver other than by administering or dispensing a controlled
substance." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-87(10) (1975); UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT §
101(i). 21 U.S.C. § 802(11) (1970) is identical in the pertinent parts.
52. In support of its view, the North Carolina Supreme Court states that the words
"distribute or dispense" are terms confined to "technical medical connotations." 292 N.C. at
309, 233 S.E.2d at 554. This is an arguable proposition. A number of other state and federal
courts have convicted street pushers of "dispensing" and/or "distributing" drugs. Those that
have convicted street pushers of "distributing" include United States v. Joseph, 533 F.2d 282
(5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1698 (1977); United States v. Garcia, 528 F.2d 580 (5th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Oquendo, 505 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Visuna,
395 F. Supp. 352 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd, 524 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1975). Other courts have convicted
nonmedical people of "dispensing," e.g., People v. Fenninger, - Colo. -, 552 P.2d 1018
(1976); People v. Dinkel, - Colo. -, 541 P.2d 898 (1975). One commentator has suggested that
the primary purpose of the amendment was to alter provisions of the Act concerning the use of
prior convictions under the Act and to change the statutory presumption concerning possession
as it relates to intent to sell. Interview with Michael Crowell, Associate Professor, Institute of
Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, in Chapel Hill (Aug. 29, 1977). Since
no legislative intent to attach such significance to the change in wording appears from the
available documentation describing the history of the amendment, it seems that the court's
reliance on the legislature's intentions is suspect. See NORTH CAROLINA SOLICITORS' ASS'N,
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE 1973 GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOR LEGISLATION AFFECTING CRIMINAL
LAW 34 (1973) (distributed to each legislator); Crumpler, Controlled Substances Act, POPULAR
GOV'T, June 1973, at 13 (summary of legislative action on Controlled Substances Act).
53. Law of July 19, 1971, ch. 919, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1492 (formerly codified at
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legislative intent to exempt the practitioner from the provisions of section
90-95 by virtue of his status as a doctor.-4 This distinction, however,
appears to have a weak substantive foundation. Although the Federal Act
does require yearly registration by all physicians who dispense controlled
substances, 55 such registration is pro forma-the Attorney General has no
discretion to refuse the registration of any physician who is properly li-
censed by a state authority. 56 Moreover, physicians who do not dispense reg-
ulated drugs from their offices but who merely administer or prescribe
them are subject to no federal registration requirements. 57 Thus, the minimal
registration requirements placed on doctors by the federal government
reflect only a minor difference in the attitudes of the Federal and North
Carolina Acts toward the treatment of doctors and appears insufficient to
justify a difference in application of the primary felony provisions of the
respective Acts.
In addition, the North Carolina Supreme Court justified its interpreta-
tion of the North Carolina Act on the basis that, unlike the Federal Act,5" it
provides "essentially the same" penalties for both medical and nonmedical
offenders. 59 The court added that, while "minor penalties" are provided in
the federal counterpart of section 90-108, there are "potentially stiff penal-
ties" under the North Carolina section, thereby indicating that "the Legisla-
ture felt that the unlawful acts proscribed . . . were more than minor
'technical violations' . . . .60
Although the court stated that the penalties for medical and nonmedical
offenders are "essentially the same," the latter are subject to a maximum
penalty for a first offense of illegally distributing a Schedule II substance of
ten years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. 6' In contrast, physicians who
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-101(c)(4) (1975)).This section was repealed by Law of July 1, 1977, ch.
891, § 4(2), 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 517 (Pamphlet No. 11, Pt. 2).
54. 292 N.C. at 305, 233 S.E.2d at 551.
55. 21 U.S.C. § 822(a) (1970).
56. United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. at 140-41. 21 U.S.C. § 823(0 (1970) states that
"[p]ractitioners shall be registered to dispense or conduct research with controlled substances
in schedule If, I1, IV, ir V if they are authorized to dispense or conduct research under the law
of the State in which they practice." The only restriction applied by the Federal Act is that
special registration with the Attorney General is required to authorize a physician to deal in
Schedule I drugs, those controlled substances that have no accepted value for medical treat-
ment. See id. § 823 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1; Recent Devel-
opments, supra note 21, at 184.
57. Davis, supra note 5, at 344.
58. In drafting the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, the Commissioners, believing that
such matters should be left to the discretion of the states, included no penalty provisions.
UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCEs AcT, Prefatory Note.
59. 292 N.C. at 308-09, 233 S.E.2d at 553.
60. Id. at 309, 233 S.E.2d at 553.
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(b)(1) (1975).
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dispense a Schedule II substance outside the course of their professional
practice are subject to a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment and a
$5000 fine.62 Although all convictions for sale or delivery under section 90-
95 are classified as felonies, physicians are considered guilty of only a
misdemeanor unless it is established that they committed the offense inten-
tionally. 63 Thus, a higher burden of proof is required to convict a physician
of a felonious drug offense than to convict a street dealer of the same type of
offense. Although there may be merit to lesser punishment of physicians for
such transgressions, comparison of sections 90-95 and 90-108 refutes the
argument that the penalties for violations are "essentially the same" for
both groups.
This difference is magnified upon subsequent violations of the Con-
trolled Substances Act. If the Best decision is interpreted as meaning that
the practitioner is totally "exempted from the proscriptions of section 90-
95,'"'1 then he would receive no additional punishment for subsequent
offenses, since section 90-108 makes no provision for additional penalties
under such circumstances. 65 In contrast, for a conviction under section 90-
95 following conviction for two or more felonies under the same section, a
defendant can receive up to thirty years in prison and a $30,000 fine.
66
In addition, the federal penalties referred to as "minor" by the North
Carolina Supreme Court are not without substance. 67 Substantial sanctions
are provided for commercial type offenses (a maximum of one year impris-
onment and $25,000 fine)68 and for fraudulent offenses committed inten-
tionally or knowingly (a maximum of four years imprisonment and $30,000
fine). 69 The maximum penalty in North Carolina for similar offenses is the
section 90-108 sanction of five years imprisonment and $5000 fine for an
intentional offense.70 In view of the lack of a major difference in the federal
and state penalties for such violations, it is difficult to discern a definitive
62. Id. § 90-108(b).
63. Id.
64. 292 N.C. at 303, 305, 233 S.E.2d at 550, 551.
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-108(b) (1975).
66. Id. § 90-95(e)(2).
67. Ironically, Judge Ely in his dissent to United States v. Rosenberg used the stiff
punishments prescribed under the federal counterpart of § 90-108 to justify treatment of doctors
solely under those sections. 515 F.2d 190, 201 (9th Cir.) (dissent), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031
(1975). Even though he was convinced that the federal law established a separate system for
punishing physicians who prescribe Schedule II through V drugs outside the course of accepted
medical practice, however, Judge Ely thought it significant that the Act confers no authority on
registered physicians to deal in Schedule I controlled substances. Therefore, he maintained that
a physician may illegally dispense Schedule I controlled substances and be prosecuted under §
841, the primary felony provision, for so doing. Id. at 202.
68. 21 U.S.C. § 842(c) (1970).
69. Id. § 843(c).
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-108(b) (1975).
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legislative intent to regard these violations in North Carolina in any different
light from their federal counterparts. 7 '
Finally, the court emphasized that "[i]t is apparent that the North
Carolina Drug Commission. .. views [the Act] as establishing a parallel
system" 72 and added that "[w]here an issue of statutory construction arises,
the construction adopted by those charged with the execution and admini-
stration of the law is relevant and may be considered." ' 73 It is difficult,
however, to perceive such an interpretation from the publications of the
Commission. Their Physicians' Reference on Drug Laws and Emergency
Treatment,74 cited by the court in support of its analysis, 75 states that
practitioners are "primarily concerned" with the prohibitions of section 90-
108.76 Clearly, the vast majority of doctors need only ensure compliance
with the technical aspects of dispensing controlled substances since they
routinely confine the issuance of such drugs to the accepted course of
professional practice. The use of the word "primarily," however, suggests
that other provisions may be of secondary concern to the physician. 77 There
is no suggestion that physicians who violate a provision of the Controlled
Substances Act should be charged under any language other than the
"manufacture, sale or delivery" of the drug-at, least in situations where
their conduct is comparable to that of a trafficker.
The interpretation by the North Carolina Supreme Court of the state's
Controlled Substances Act represents a radical departure from the view
taken by the United States Supreme Court and the federal and state tribunals
that have considered legislation substantially similar to the North Carolina
scheme. If the North Carolina court's opinion is read broadly, it opens the
way for unscrupulous practitioners to sell drugs "primarily for the profits to
be derived therefrom" 78 without being subject to the same severe criminal
71. This regulatory structure could also be viewed as enacting substantial penalties for
acts such as fraudulent practices, improper use of order blanks and illegal issuance of prescrip-
tions in order to deter such conduct while retaining even harsher penalties for conduct that is
equivalent to that of the street trafficker.
72. 292 N.C. at 308, 233 S.E.2d at 553.
73. Id.
74. NORTH CAROLINA DRUG AUTHORITY, PHYSICIANS' REFERENCE ON DRUG LAWS AND
EMERGENCY TREATMENT (1972).
75. 292 N.C. at 308, 233 S.E.2d at 553.
76. NORTH CAROLINA DRUG AUTHORITY, supra note 74, at 11-12.
77. Another publication of the Commission, which provides sample arrest warrant forms,
only sets forth language paralleling the wording of § 90-95, the primary felony section. NORTH
CAROLINA DRUG AUTHORITY, DRUG LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA (INCLUDING REGULATIONS) 155-
66 app. (1975).
78. United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. at 135 (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10,
reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4575).
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penalties that apply to their nonmedical counterparts. 79 Another conse-
quence of the court's opinion is that prosecutors must be extremely careful
in wording their indictments. If medical practitioners are charged with
"selling or delivering" or street traffickers with "dispensing or distribut-
ing," a fatal variance will result.
80
It is unfortunate that the North Carolina Supreme Court chose to
interpret the entire Controlled Substances Act in a manner that is not
supported by either logic or precedent. The court could have avoided the
massive statutory interpretation it undertook and reached the same result by
ruling that the evidence was not sufficient for a conviction under the Act. l
The physician who employs controlled substances in treatment of his pa-
tients is faced with very real and very serious problems: because it is
acknowledged that all controlled substances except those in Schedule 182
have useful and legitimate medical purposes, he must be given the flexibility
79. The concern felt by the courts that refused to find a dual system of regulation was
voiced by the Rosenberg opinion in that since registration is pro forma for the most part, the
physician would be able to "stand on [any] street corner and sell prescriptions to passersby"
with impunity because he would not be writing prescriptions but personally delivering con-
trolled substances. 515 F.2d 190, 194 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975). Under a dual
system the penalties for violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 842 and 843 would be triggered by a violation
of § 829, which requires a written- prescription "[e]xcept when dispensed directly by a prac-
titioner. . . to an ultimate user." Thus, directly dispensing a drug without a prescription would
not be a violation under those two sections. For a further exposition on this shortcoming of a
dual system of regulation, see Recent Developments, supra note 21, at 190.
Furthermore, the same deleterious effects are felt by the addict and society whether or not
the source of supply is a medical one, especially in light of statistics estimating that physicians,
pharmacists and other professionals are currently the source, intentionally or not, of as much as
90% of the dangerous drugs found in the illicit market. Weir, supra note 5, at 484.
80. Because of the acceptance by other courts of indictments charging physicians with the
sale or delivery of a controlled substance, it is questionable whether there was a fatal variance
in this indictment. The indictments that charged Dr. Best, although they tracked the "sell and
deliver" language of § 90-95, stated no violation of any particular section of the North Carolina
Act. See text accompanying notes 18 & 19 supra. The controlling factor should be that argued
by the State in Best:
[I]n reaching a determination as to whether or not there is a fatal defect in an
indictment, the primary consideration is whether or not the indictment informed the
defendant of the charges against him in order that he might prepare a defense and
protect himself from another prosecution for the same offense.
New Brief for the State at 20 (citations omitted). There would seem to be no question here that
Dr. Best was made fully aware of the crimes with which he was charged. Accord, United States
v. Fellman, 549 F.2d 181, 182 (10th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
81. One only needs examine the facts of the Moore case and others to recognize that Dr.
Best's alleged conduct falls far below the level of abuses that have resulted in convictions for
substantive violations of the Controlled Substances Acts. See text accompanying notes 26-28
supra.
82. A Schedule I drug is defined as one with a "high potential for abuse, no currently
accepted medical use in the United States, or a lack of accepted safety for use in treatment
under medical supervision." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-89 (1975 & Supp. 1975). Examples are
heroin and lysergic acid diethylamaide (LSD). See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (1970).
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to use them in a manner that will most effectively help his patients without
the worry of being second-guessed by a jury.
83
By the time the North Carolina legislature passed its version of the Act
and subsequent amendments thereto, other similar acts had been interpreted
by a number of state and federal courts. The North Carolina Supreme Court
has in effect changed the legislative history of the Act and denied the
legislature the insight that comes from studying and evaluating similar
statutes.
ANN LASHLEY SAWYER
83. Also, the ongoing updating of drug schedules requires consfant attention by the busy
practitioner. Compounding this problem is the fact that often,
"detailmen," employees of drug companies, are a major source of. . . information
regarding new drugs or developments concerning drugs already on the market, It is
highly improbable that this source or the advertisements in medical journals keep the
physician abreast of what the drug culture has discovered for new "highs" or what
group is abusing what drug.
Davis, supra note 5, at 360.
There are compelling policy reasons for punishing doctors differently than other persons
for violatons of the controlled substances laws. In United States v. Moore, the Supreme Court
noted that
Congress understandably was concerned that the drug laws not impede legitimate
research and that physicians be allowed reasonable discretion in treating patients and
testing new theories ...
In enacting the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970
. . . Congress faced the problem directly. Because of the potential for abuse it
decided that some limits on free experimentation with drugs were necessary.
423 U.S. at 143. The Court added that Congress required the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare, in consultation with the Attorney General and national professional organizations,
to determine the appropriate professional standards for treating addicts in order to provide
clarification for the medical profession. Id. at 144. Prior to this time many doctors were afraid
to take addicts as patients because of the uncertain state of the law.
In arguing for a new approach to the problem by legislatures, courts, medical schools and
the medical profession, Professor Davis observes that
Drug abuse is not confined to the narcotic addict nor to the user of hallucinogens.
Medicine cabinets across the country are filled with stimulants and depressants pre-
scribed by overworked physicians catering to an uptight, overweight populace. As real
and tragic as this situation is, one must, nonetheless, question whether the criminal
sanctions imposed upon the medical community are really the answer. Perhaps the
underlying problem and the ultimate solution lie in the areas of professional responsi-
bility and medical ethics.
Davis, supra at 359.
The same system of punishment, however, should apply to all who dispense or distribute
Schedule I drugs. The North Carolina Supreme Court seems to support this view. Although it
says that transactions that are exempted from the proscriptions of § 90-95 are those that involve
drugs authorized by other provisions of the Act, such transactions would not include the
dispensing or distributing of Schedule I drugs by practitioners. Thus, it is arguable that if faced
squarely with the question, the court would hold physicians who sell or deliver heroin, LSD or
other Schedule I substances subject to the penalties under § 90-95.
